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µ¶Á¡ ½ÃÀå
µ¶Á¡ÀÇ Á¸Àç
- ±â¼úÀû ÁøÀÔ À庮
- »ý»ê¿ä¼ÒÀÇ µ¶Á¡Àû ¼ÒÀ¯
- ±Ô¸ðÀÇ °æÁ¦ cf. ÀÚ¿¬ µ¶Á¡ (natural monopoly)
- ±â¼ú»óÀÇ ¿ìÀ§
- Á¦µµÀû ÁøÀÔ À庮
- ƯÇã±Ç
- Á¤ºÎÀÇ ÀÎÇã°¡
- Àü¸Å±Ç
±ÕÇü
- µ¶Á¡ ±â¾÷ÀÇ ¼ö¿ä Á¶°Ç (P > MR)
Why MR < P ?
- ÀÌÀ± ±Ø´ëÈ (MR = MC)
- µ¶Á¡ °¡°Ý
- µ¶Á¡°¡°Ý (Pm) vs. °æÀï°¡°Ý(Pc)
°¡°Ý Â÷º°
- °¡°Ý Â÷º° (price discrimination)ÀÇ Á¶°Ç
- ºñ°æÀïÀû ½ÃÀå
- Àü¸ÅÀÇ ºÒ°¡´É
- ½ÃÀå ºÐ¸®
- °¡°ÝÂ÷º°ÀÇ À¯Çü
- ¿ÏÀü °¡°Ý Â÷º° (perfect price discrimination)
1Â÷ °¡°Ý Â÷º° (first-degree price discrimination)
- 3Â÷ °¡°Ý Â÷º°
MC = MRA = MRB
- 2Â÷ °¡°Ý Â÷º°
- ±¸°£º° °¡°Ý (block pricing)
- ¹¾î ÆÈ±â (bundling)
- 2ºÎ °¡°Ý (two-part tariff)
- °¡°ÝÂ÷º°ÀÇ Æò°¡
µ¶Á¡ÀÇ Æò°¡
- Pm > MC
- µ¶Á¡µµ
Lerner index LI = (P - MC) / P
- µ¶Á¡ÀÇ »çȸÀû ºñ¿ë
- ÀÚÁß ¼Õ½Ç (dead-weight loss)
- ÀÌ±Ç Ãß±¸ ÇàÀ§ (rent-seeking behavior)
- X ºñÈ¿À²¼º (X-inefficiency)
- ±â¼ú °³¹ß
- °æÁ¦·Â ÁýÁß
µ¶Á¡ÀÇ ±ÔÁ¦
- ÇÑ°è ºñ¿ë °¡°Ý ¼³Á¤ (marginal cost pricing): P = MC
- Æò±Õ ºñ¿ë °¡°Ý ¼³Á¤ (average cost pricing): P = AC
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